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Household Services and Child Care in the Income
Tax and Social Security Laws
WILLIAm D. POPKIN*
INTRODUCTION
Recent changes in the income tax liberalized the deduction of pay-
ments for household and child care services but retained a number of
restrictions on the deduction.' Both the liberalization and the restric-
tions were apparently based on the theory that such expenses should be
deductible when incurred for business rather than personal reasons. In
a seemingly contradictory spirit, there is also considerable congressional
sympathy for recognizing the performance of household and child care
services as productive work which enhances a family's standard of
living for purposes of determining social security benefits.2 The resolu-
tion of these and other issues raised by the income tax and social security
treatment of housework is of current social significance in the context of
the women's movement because women are the major producers of
housework, and is of broader concern because it requires consideration
of fundamental concepts of equity and neutrality in the tax and welfare
structure. The criteria for resolving these issues are the subject of this
article.
This article argues that housework performed at home by a family
member significantly adds to the family's standard of living and that
the paramount objective of the income tax and social security structure
should be neutrality between housework and wage work, even at the
* A.B. 1958, LL.B. 1961, Harvard University; Professor of Law, Indiana Univer-
sity, Bloomington.
IRevenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 210(a), 85 Stat 518, amending IT.
REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 214 (codified at INT. REv. CODE op 1954, § 214) [hereinafter the
x954 Code will be cited by section number without further identification]. Although the
text refers to "child care," the statute also allows a deduction when an incapacitated
member of the family is being cared for. Sections 214(b) (1) (B), (C).
See generally Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Tax-
ation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 49 (1971) ; Feld, Deductibility
of Expenses for Child Care and Household Services: New Section 214, 27 TAx L. REV.
415 (1972); Hjorth, A Tax Subsidy for Child Care: Section 210 of the Revenue Act of
1971, 50 TAXES 133 (1972); Klein, Tax Deduction for Family Care Expenses, 14 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 917 (1973).2 See, e.g., H.R. 16030, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (value of household services per-
formed by individuals is considered in determining social security benefits) ; cf. H.R. 996,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (houseworker allowed to set up her own pension plan with
tax advantages).
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cost of introducing some inequities into the tax Eystem. Such an ap-
proach would result in a further liberalization of the income tax
deduction for household and child care, a reduction in the amount of
wages currently subject to social security tax, an increase in the wages
used as the basis for cbmputing social security benefits, and recognition
of a separate social security benefit for the wife independent of her
husband.
The proper treatment of housework will be illustrated by three
typical families whose circumstances and tax treatment are set forth
in Table I. In Family W (FW), the husband earns $100 wages and the
wife, Wage-earner (Ww), earns $30 wages, $20 of which are paid to a
housekeeper to care for the house and children.' In Family H (FE),
the husband also earns $100 wages and the wife, Housekeeper (WH3),
also works but earns no money; she takes care of the house and chil-
dren. In Family L (FL), the husband earns $130 wages, but the wife,
Leisure (WL), does not work; she pays a housekeeper $20 to care f6r
the house and children. Since the major point of this article is the
desirability of neutrality between the wage-worker and the houseworker,
FW and F- should be thought of as two potential styles of life which
a family could adopt. FL should be considered an actual family whose
treatment in relation to FW and FH may raise problems of equity.
TABLE I
Family W Family H Family L
Cash Wages:
Husband $100 $100 $130
Cash Wages: none-
Wife 30 houseworker none-leisure
Household and Child
Care Expenses 20 none 20
Wages Taxed:
Income Tax 110 100 130
Wages Taxed:
Social Security Tax 130 100 130
3 A 30 percent ratio of the wife's earnings to the husband's earnings is used because
the median earnings in 1972 of families where the wife workel1 was about 30 percent
higher than in families where the wife had no earnings. See Waldman & Grover, Marital
and Family Characteristics of the Labor Force, 95 MONTHLY LAIt. REv., April 1972, at 4,
8 ($11,940 compared to $9,175). Earlier statistics indicate a similar ratio. See CITIZENS'
AnvxsoRy COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SOCIAL
INSURANCE AND TAXEs 70 (1968) ($8,597 compared to $6,592) [hereinafter cited as
TASK FORCE].
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Social Security
Benefit Base 100 100 130
Social Security
Benefit for Wife 50% of 50% of 50% of
(Derivative) husband's husband's husband's
benefit benefit benefit
Currently the income tax law determines that each family has the
following income tax base: FW with the working wife (Ww)-$110;'
FI with the housewife (W)-$100; and FL in which the wife does
not work (WL)-$130. FH is not taxed on the value of the housework
produced by WH, but FW can deduct the cost of purchasing similar
services. In each case, the family is the taxable unit and the final tax
reflects adjustments for children in the form of a deduction for personal
exemptions5 and adjustments for the extra costs of supporting two
people in the form of lower tax rates than are applicable to an unmarried
individual with the -same income as the family unit.6
The social security tax is levied on the gross wages of these families
computed as follows: FW-$130; FH-$100; FL--$130. Although
the value of housework produced for FH by WH is not subject to the
social security tax, the household and child care expenses incurred by
FW are not deductible. No adjustment is made for the size of the
family; a single person with $130 of earnings pays the same social
security tax as FW and FL.
Social security uses gross wages not only as a tax base, but also
to determine the measure of benefits, i.e., as a "benefit base."7 The
social security benefit base for our three families is as follows: FW-
$100; FH-$100; FL-$130. FW's benefit base is lower than its
social security tax base because the husband's and wife's earnings are
not added together to determine benefits. However, the wife in all
three families is entitled as a worker's spouse to an extra benefit equal
to 50 percent of the husband's benefit.' The wife, therefore, receives a
"derivative" benefit based on her husband's earnings whether or not
she has earnings of her own. If her own cash earnings entitle her to
4 This assumes that section 214 allows the deduction in full. See text accompanying
notes 26-31 for limitations on the deduction.
6 Sections 151(e), 152(a) (1).
8 Compare section 1(a) with section 1(c).
7 The "average monthly wage" with adjustments is the benefit base. 42 U.S.C. §§
415(a), (b) (1970).
8 Id. § 402(b).
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benefits which exceed her derivative benefits, she is entitled to the
excess.
9
INCOME TAX
Imputed Income Aspects of Housework
Consideration of the proper tax treatment of housework must begin
with a discussion of the broader issue of "imputed income." Imputed
income is the value of goods and services derived from the use of
property and the performance of services for oneself, the most common
examples of which are the rental value of owner-occupied residences"
and household and child care services performed by a member of the
family." The public finance literature generally recognizes such income
as a valuable addition to a family's standard of living, but judicial
elaboration of the definition of "income" for income tax purposes has
usually excluded imputed income.' 2 Administrative problems are often
cited as the major reason for exclusion, 3 but they are only part of
9 If the wife has any social security benefits based on her own earnings, they are
treated as her own rather than as a derivative benefit. Her derivative benefit is, how-
ever, reduced by her own benefit. Id. §§ 402(b) (1) (E), (K) ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.407(a)
(1974). The fact that it is her own benefit-is important because her husband's earnings
can reduce her derivative benefit, but not benefits based on her own earnings. 42 U.S.C.
§ 403(b) (1970). Her own work also entitles her to disability bmefits, and her survivors
can receive a derivative benefit based on her earnings. TASK Fo'ZCE at 71.
The wife's own benefit is not likely to be close to her derivative benefit for a num-
ber of reasons. First, most families do not have two worker ,; in 1966, couples with
working wives represented about one third of all couples. Thi; figure has undoubtedly
risen. Second, the wife's own benefits are based on her "average monthly wage." Al-
though she can omit the five lowest years of earnings in determiring her average monthly
wage, she may ndt be working consistently enough during her lifetime for her own ben-
fits to exceed her derivative benefit. Third, recent figures indicate that the wife's con-
tribution to median family income is only 37 percent of the husband's income. See Wald-
man & Grover, supra note 3, at 8:
$9,175
- 37%
$11,940 + $9,175
20 W. VicKIEY, AGENDA FOR PROGREssIvE TAXATION 18 (1917) ; Marsh, The Taxa-
tion of Imputed Income, 58 POL. ScI. Q. 514, 517 (1943).
"2 W. VicKREY, supra note 10, at 44-45; Marsh, supra note 10, at 515, 517.
12 See Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371 (1934) (imputed rental
value not "income"). The reluctance to tax imputed income has affected the court's
willingness to attribute income under section 482; see Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 496 (1972). But cf. Kerry Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 479 (1972)
(income imputed when borrower had gross income).
But see Commissioner v. M inzer, 279 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1960) (insurance agent
taxed on commissions received on insurance purchased on own life) ; cf. Hatch v. Em-
ployment Security Agency, 79 Idaho 246, 313 P.2d 1067 (1957) (carpenter not "un-
employed" while building his own house).
13 W. VICKREY, supra note 10, at 22; Marsh, supra note 10, at 520. See also PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON SOCIAL
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the problem. The popular view that imputed income is not really income
has a sounder theoretical base in the case of services performed for
oneself than is commonly supposed, for reasons to be elaborated shortly.
Concern for neutral tax treatment between housework and wage work
makes the determination of whether housework is imputed income
crucial. For if housework were not income, i.e., if it produced no
significant increase in a family's standard of living, then preferential
treatment for untaxed housework in contrast with taxed wages would
be a minor problem; it is only when housework is a significant item of
value, which is untaxed, that there will be an incentive to shun wage
work, which is taxed.
The first objection to treating services for oneself as income is that,
in a society in which labor is very specialized, many self-produced
services do not approach the value of the same services purchased on
the market. Second, there is often a drastic loss of leisure in perform-
ing many services for oneself which the income tax law should con-
sider. The argument for not taxing the fruits of one's own labor because
of loss of leisure rests on one of two theories. The first is that leisure
is enjoyment and should therefore be taxed, but since leisure is too hard
to tax, equity between workers and nonworkers is preserved only by
reducing the tax on those who work and give up leisure. The difficulty
with this approach is that the general tax concept of income1' includes
only that enjoyment which is obtained by an expenditure of a claim on
society's resources. Leisure, though enjoyable, does not involve an
expenditure of resources, and its omission from the tax base does not
therefore create an inequity.
The second theory rests on the more persuasive argument that ex-
empting leisure from taxation destroys the neutrality between work
and leisure and therefore discourages work. This concern leads to the
same result as the first theory; because taxing leisure is impractical,
INSURANCE AND TAXES 37 (1963). For example, the rental value of property and the
value of services performed in the house are very difficult to measure. The information
necessary to determine value is not normally acquired in administering the income tax
law and, in the case of household and child care services, is known only to a few people.
14 The definition of income in terms of consumption is itself a debatable point but
one which I accept. W. POPKIN, THE DEDUcTION FOR BUSINESS EXPENSES AND LOSSES
16 (1973). See also Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv.
L. REv. 309, 320-27 (1972).
A further question is whether consumption should refer to enjoyment generally, en-joyment obtained by exercising claims on society's resources (i.e., making expenditures),
or enjoyment obtained only by private consumption, not public goods such as charity.
Professor Andrews would adopt the last definition. Id. at 356. I reject the first defini-
tion but am still not convinced that the second definition is unacceptable.
In any event, the enjoyment of leisure would be income only under the first criterion.
[Vol. 50:238
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neutrality between leisure and work may be preseri ed only by reducing
the tax on work.
Neither argument for reducing the tax on workers because leisure
is exempt has had much appeal in the United States, although the tax on
earnings has been reduced during two earlier periods." But the problem
of discouraging work by exempting leisure may be especially serious in
the cases of services performed for oneself. Many services for oneself
are especially burdensome, occurring after normal working hours or
on weekends when the private market place usually recognizes the extra
burden of overtime work by paying at least time and a half for it. In
order to avoid discouraging this type of work, therefore, its fruits
should not be taxed in full. Considering the disincentive effect of taxing
work performed for oneself and the questionable N alue of the product
of that work, the omission of this type of imputed income from the
tax base is probably justified.
These reasons for not taxing imputed income are frequently in-
applicable, however, when a wife performs household and child care
services. Tradition has dictated that the wife learn how to keep house
and care for children. The value of her services, unlike the value of
many services produced by a family member, is therefore likely to be
comparable to the market value of similar services."8 Furthermore,
since the work is often performed during normal working hours, a dis-
count of the value produced because of the loss of leisure seems inappro-
priate as long as wages are fully taxed. Housework is therefore imputed-
income of considerable value whose exclusion from the income tax can
only be justified on administrative grounds.
History of the Child Care Deduction
The original income tax treatment of household and child care
expenses recognized that these expenses contribute to a family's standard
of living. It therefore disallowed a deduction as a personal expense
when their value was purchased,'17 while at the same time despairing of
taxing such services when produced for oneself. The fact that such
expenses were necessary to allow a person to work was considered
irrelevant. Household and child care expenses were relegated to the
"5 Earned income was eligible for tax benefits from 1924 to 1931 and from 1934 to
1943. J. PECHiMIAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 92 (1971).16 In both M ner and Hatch, in which the values of a person's own services were
treated as analogous to his earning cash income, the individual was doing for himself
what he was normally paid to do.
17 Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), af'd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
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personal sphere of activity along with other nondeductible expenses
such as clothing and medical care, which were also necessary to enable
the individual to work."
In 1954, however, a deduction for expenses to care for a child was
allowed under narrowly defined circumstances.19 Working women were
allowed to deduct such expenses as long as they did not elect the standard
deduction ;20 married women were subject to the further condition that,
if their husbands were not incapacitated, they were eligible for the
deduction only if family income did not exceed a certain level.2 A
working man was also entitled to the deduction if he was a widower.
The amount deductible was subject to a ceiling of $600 per year.28
Since child care expenses were considered similar to business expenses,
these rules were intended to identify those individuals who incurred the
expenses for the purpose of enabling them to work.2" It was thought
that if individuals worked in order to satisfy a personal desire to pay
someone else for child care, rather than paying for the services so that
they could work, or if they would have incurred the expenses in any
event for personal reasons whether or not they worked, then the ex-
penses were nondeductible personal expenses. Thus, the income ceiling
on eligibility for the deduction when the wife's husband was not in-
capacitated guaranteed that the expenses were incurred because the
family needed the income and that the wife was not simply indulging
a personal preference for work outside the home rather than house-
work.2' The income ceiling also effectively denied the deduction to
families who would have purchased the child care for personal reasons
even if the wife did not work. The ceiling on the deduction itself also
distinguished expenses necessary to enable the individual to work from
those which indulged the worker's personal tastes.
--- See generally Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A
- Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. Rxv. 859 (1974).
19 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 214(a), 68A Stat. 70.
20 Sections 62(2), 63(b).
21 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 214(b) (2), 68A Stat. 70. By 1964, the income
ceiling was $6,000. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 212(b) (2) (B), 78 Stat.
49. 2 2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 214(a), 68A Stat. 70. In 1964, husbands with
incapacitated wives became eligible for the deduction. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-272, § 212(b) (2), 78 Stat 49.
23 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 214(b) (1) (A), 68A Stat. 70. The amount was
raised to $900 in 1964 if there were two or more children. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-272, § 212(b) (1) (B), 78 Stat. 49.
24 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954) ; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954).
25Id.
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In 1971, the income and deduction ceilings were raised consider-
ably. A family can now earn $18,000 before the deduction is reduced"
and the ceiling on the deduction is now $400 per month.27 These ceilings
are applied uniformly to all individuals eligible for the deduction. Child
care purchased outside of the home, however, is subject to a special
ceiling of $200 for the first child, $300 for two children and $400 for
three children.2" The deduction is now available to all men2 9 and pay-
ments to an individual to care for the household are deductible if a child
is also being cared for.2 This liberalization of the deduction occurred
not because the "business expense" theory was abandoned, but because
the factual setting in which it was realistic to expect expenses to be in-
curred to enable an individual to work had simply expanded."
Although the congressional history indicates that these expenses
were viewed as business expenses, it is difficult to ju3tify their deduction
on that ground. Even if the taxpayer incurs the expenses in order to
work, the decision to have children is a personal one. The situation is
analogous to commuting expenses, which must be incurred ip order for
the individual to earn wages. 2 They are presumed to arise from the
individual's personal decision to live beyond walking distance and are,
therefore, personal expenses. Expenses for houselhtold and child care
are similarly grounded in a personal decision.
Justifications for the Deduction
A plausible argument can be made that caring for the household
and children is a personal obligation which should t e recognized in the
tax law by a reduced tax burden. This argument leads, however, to a
reduction in the tax burden for all individuals who pay to discharge
these obligations without regard to their work experience or their
reasons for working.3" Families FW and FL, for example, would
both be entitled to deductions. It would not matter that WL does not
26 Section 214(d). Each dollar of income over $18,000 reduces the deduction by 50
cents.
27 Section 214(c) (1).
28 Section 214(c) (2) (B).
20 Sections 214(a), (b) (1). Previously, only widowers and husbands with incapaci-
tated wives were eligible. See note 22 supra.
-0 Sections 214(b) (1), (2) (A).
31See S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 59-61 (1971).
32 Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1964). Cf. United States v. Gilmore,
372 U.S. 39 (1963).
-3 Care of a child by a single individual may now entitle the taxpayer to head-of-
household rates. Section 1(b). See sections 151(e), 152 (a) (2) (deduction for de-
pendent children).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
work, or that Ww might be working to earn money to pay for child care
rather than incurring costs to enable her to work.
A deduction for household and child care expenses incurred by a
wage-earner is entirely appropriate, however, as a technique for equal-
izing the tax bases of wives who work at home to produce household
and child care services of significant value (WH) and wives who earn
wages (Ww) . The deduction establishes neutrality between the two
types of work available to the individual, housework and wage work.
These 'arguments favoring the child care deduction can be illustrated by
reference to FW and FH. The wife in FH (WHi) produced tax-free
income of considerable value. If she wishes to become a Ww, the pay-
ments she makes for services will probably purchase value equal to that
which she previously produced. Thus while her $30 of earnings in-
creased her standard of living by only $10, without a deduction, her
tax base would be $30 greater.
Because of the difficulty of taxing WHa's imputed income,85 the
most practical method for the income tax to avoid the bias in favor of
the wife who produces tax-free income at home is to allow Ww to
deduct household and child care expenses. A deduction for Ww, how-
ever, produces imperfections of its own. The reduction of FW's tax
base to $110 makes FW better off than FL, which is taxed on $130 of
income, even though both families have $130 of income."8 The inequity
of treating equals (FW and FL) differently is the price paid for elim-
inating the bias in favor of household work."
The "neutrality" rationale for allowing the deduction of household
and child care expenses yields results different from those produced by
the business expense theory embodied in the current statute. 8 First, a
family in which the wife earns wages because she prefers to purchase
these services rather than to perform them herself should be entitled
to a deduction. According to the business expense analysis, expenses
3 The discussion deals with wives because they are most likely to perform household
and child care services. Men are also eligible for a deduction in those circumstances
where they are likely to be called upon to provide such services. See note 29 supra. Men
may, therefore, be able to deduct more for purchased service than the value of services
they would have produced at home. The importance of symbolic equality between the
sexes, however, may require that men and women be treated similarly in the statute.
35 See note 13 supra. ,
86 FL might be considered better off because of LL's leisure. The advantage of leisure
over remunerative work is not normally considered in the income tax. But see text ac-
companying note 15 supra.
s7 See Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rv. Ecox.
STUDIES 11 (1956).
38 See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra.
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should not be deducted in this situation because th ey are not incurred
to enable the wife to work. Deductions were, therefore, limited to those
cases in which the total income of the family was lo x enough ($18,000)
to indicate that the expenses were incurred for that purpose. An income
tax concerned primarily with the neutral treatment of FW and FH
would not distinguish between those situations in which Ww earns
wages because she prefers wage labor to housework and those in which
she needs the money to supplement the family income and therefore
pays for the services so she can work. Indeed, the former situation,
in which the wife is primarily moved by her desire to get out of the
house, presents at least as sympathetic a case for neutral treatment as
the situation in which the wife pays for services in order to earn wages.
An income ceiling higher than $18,000 is therefore appropriate. The
only concern would be to disallow the deduction if the family would
have incurred the expenses whether or not the wife worked. For ex-
ample, if WL becomes Ww and earns wages, no deduction is necessary
to prevent discrimination in favor of a wife who e rns imputed income
by performing household and child care services. WVL did not produce
such income before she worked and her wages, therefore, contribute in
full to an increased standard of living for FL.'9
Second, the cost of household services should be deductible whether
or not a child is being cared for." If there is concern that expenses in-
curred for household services will exceed the value of similar services
produced by the wife if she had stayed at home, the imposition of a
dollar ceiling on deductible household expenses would prevent any excess
value from being deducted. 1 The disallowance of the deduction in the
current law probably results from the assumption, rdevant to a business
expense theory, that individuals without children are more likely to work
to pay for household services than to incur such expenses in order to
work. However, a focus on equal treatment of Ww and WH would not
make the wife's deduction depend upon her motive for earning wages.
39 For example, if L earns $50, FL now has $180 income, not the $130 it previously
enjoyed. Only when L is a working housewife does earning $5o wages fail to increase
the family's standard of living by $50. Of course, 'L might not be $50 better off because
of loss of leisure. See note 36 supra.
40Sections 214(a), (b) (1).
4 For example, a lower ceiling than $400 per month might be imposed when there
is no dependent to be cared for. The present limitation on the deduction for child care
provided outside the home in § 214(c) (2) (B) can similarly be ju< tified on the theory that
a greater expense will purchase services which could not have becn provided in the home.
Educational services, which are often provided with expensive child care outside the
home, are not likely to be a service provided by the wife.
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Third, the current requirement that the wife be employed full-time 2
is not justified in the case of child care, if the purpose of the deduction
is to equalize the tax burden on the housewife and wage-earning wife.
If Ww works only half a day, the expenses for child care still replace
the work she would otherwise have performed at home.
Fourth, it is inappropriate to disallow the deduction if the standard
deduction is elected. The standard deduction replaces the deduction of
small business expenses to simplify tax administration. The effect on
business decisions of eliminating deductions for actual expenses is
usually slight because the replaced expenses are small. Indeed, where ex-
penses are large, as in the case of moving expenses and travelling ex-
penses away from home, both the standard deduction and actual expenses
are deductible. By characterizing the household and child care deduction
as a business expense, Congress has unwittingly lumped this together with
small business expenses for which the loss of deductibility is unlikely to
have an adverse impact on an individual's decisions. If the deduction had
been conceived as a technique for equalizing tax burdens on wage work
and housework, disallowance of the deduction when the standard deduc-
tion was elected might not have been so easily accepted. The disallow-
ance reintroduces WH's advantage by allowing FH both the standard
deduction and exclusion of the value of the wife's services, whereas FW
can take only the standard deduction.
SOCIAL SECURITY
There are two problems in the design of the social security benefit
and tax structure which concern the working wife: (1) neutrality
between families in which the wife works at home (FH with WH)
and those in which the wife earns wages (FV with Ww); and (2) the
wife's entitlement to a benefit separate from her husband's benefit. In
considering these problems we will first analyze the benefit structure
without regard to taxes and then consider the effect of taxes on the
proper solution.
To understand the following discussion, a brief outline of the social
security benefit and tax structure is essential. An individual's benefit
base is related to past wages on the theory that wages are a good indica-
tion of the individual's prior standard of living which should be the
measure of retirement income. In order to help the poor, however,
benefits are a larger percentage of the benefit base as wages decline. The
benefit base for a family is not the family's total wages, but is tied to the
income of the primary worker. Both FW and FH, for example, have
[Vol. 50:238
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$100 benefit bases; FL's benefit base is $130. Ww's wages are not part
of FW's benefit base.
Taxes are imposed on all gross wages and collected by employer
withholding. Although wages must be taxed to be included in the
the benefit base, the converse is not true for a husba,.nd and wife. While
both pay taxes on wages, the wife's wages are not included in the
family's benefit base. Thus, FW pays taxes on $1.30, a tax base equal
to FL's, even though its benefit base is only $100, a benefit base equal to
FH's.
The benefit structure for a family, however, is a function not only
of its benefit base but also of the number of members in the family.
Without regard to the taxed wages or untaxed household work of the
spouse, the spouse is entitled to a benefit equal to 50 percent of the
benefit received by the primary worker, who in most families is the
husband. Thus, the wife in all three families, even VL in FL, is entitled
to a derivative benefit intended primarily as a welfare measure to meet
the greater needs of a two-person household. Although Ww's wages
entitle her to her own benefits, she can collect an amount over her deriv-
ative benefit only in the unlikely event that her own benefit exceeds the
derivative benfit.4 3
Neutrality Between Families
The failure to combine the wages of working family members to
compute their benefit base has been severely criticized because combined
earnings are the best measure of a family's standard of living." FW's
benefit base is lower than FL's even though they both had $130 of
earnings which, disregarding WL'S leisure, 5 indicates a similar standard
of living.
A closer examination of the comparative situations of FW and
FH, the two families with working wives, suggests, however, that there
are problems with treating FW and FL equally, problems similar to
those encountered in assigning equal income tax bases to FW and FL.
If FW's benefit base were $130, it would exceed FH's benefit base by
$30 even though FW's standard of living exceeded FH's by only $10.
Those who would eliminate pressures on women to assume the tradi-
tional housekeeping role might disregard this inequity because, unlike
42 Section 214(e) (2) (A).
3 See note 9 supra.
"4See, e.g., J. PECHMAN, H. AARON & M. TAuSSIG, SOCIAL SECURITY, PERSPECTIVES
FOR REFORM 81 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PERsPEcTIVEs]; TASK FORCE at 71-72.
45 See note 36 supra and text accompanying.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the full inclusion of working women's wages in the income tax base,
its bias is in favor of wage work rather than housework. However, the
objective of reducing the income tax base for wage-earners was neu-
trality between wage work and housework, not favoritism for wage
work. Neutrality in choice of work, not bias for a particular type of
work, should be the objective of both the income tax and social security
structures. FW's benefit base should therefore exceed FH's by only
$10.
One way to limit FW's advantage over FH would be to include the
value of WH's housework in FH's benefit base.4" This solution, how-
ever, presents insuperable difficulties because the social security benefit
base is tied to the tax base. Even if the value of WH's services could be
accurately estimated, the payment of a tax by a worker without wages,
especially a Wu with low income, would be both burdensome for the
wage-worker and difficult to enforce in the absence of employer with-
holding. The proper solution, therefore, is to provide that FW's benefit
base exceed FH's by only $10. Although this creates an inequity between
FW and FL, both of whom have standards of living equal to $130, this
is the result of neutrality between FW and FH, just as the difference
in income tax base between FW and FL is the price paid for neutralizing
the effect of the income tax on WH and Ww. Of course, since reducing
FW's income tax base helped Ww, FW would be pleased by the proposed
change in the income tax, whereas reduction of the social security benefit
base below the sum of the combined family earnings might not be
received with equal enthusiasm.
The mechanicq of including FW's wages in the benefit base but
reducing them by the price paid-for housework is not as simple as allow-
ing a deduction, which was the technique the income tax used to achieve
neutrality between WH and Ww. The social security system is wedded
to the use of gross wages as its tax base by itg reliance on reports from
employers; a deduction by Ww of her actual expenses is therefore not
administratively feasible. There is no administrative obstacle, however,
to including some predetermined percentage of Ww's wages in her
benefit base which roughly accounts for the amount by which her wages
exceed the value of housework. The only administrative changes re-
quired would be to record the combined wages of husband and wife
but increase FW's benefit base by only a predetermined percentage of the
wife's earnings.7
46 See H.R. 16030, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
47 The discussion refers to the wife because she is the family member most likely to
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The more difficult problem is to determine the appropriate percent-
age. Two figures are needed to compute the percentage-Ww's hypo-
thetical wages and the presumed value of her housework. The following
data justifies use of the Percentage employed so far in this article-
one-third of Ww's wages-but the important point is that some process
of estimating the relationship of Ww's wages to the value of her house-
work must be adopted.
For Ww's wages we used the amount which a working wife added
to the income of a male-headed household, which was $3,109 in 1971." s
There were two choices for the value of housework: $849, which was
the 1971 median income of all private household workers, 9 or $1,900,
which was 50 weeks of wages at the weekly wage in 1971 for full time
private household workers;5o we adopted the figure $1,900. According
to these figures, Ww earned about one-third more than the value of her
housework.
The analysis so far has considered only the benefit structure; we
must now analyze the effect of social security taxes on the respective
treatment of FW and FH. We will first consider the tax solely as a
revenue measure and then evaluate the combined tax-benefit structure,
analogizing the tax to an insurance premium.
The social security tax on Ww's $30 wages, nnalyzed apart from
benefits, is not defensible as a general revenue measure for two reasons.
First, the imposition of a tax on the $20 of wages wqhich equals the
tax-free imputed income earned by WH favors housework which is
tax-exempt, and is objectionable for the same reasons as is the dis-
allowance of a deduction for Ww in the income tax. Second, the re-
maining $10 of wages earned by Ww, which provided FW with a higher
standard of living than FH, does not represent the actual amount by
which FW's tax capacity exceeds FH's. The federal government
normally uses a progressive income tax to reach the differing tax
perform productive housework. If statutory equality between husband and wife is desired,
the statute should reduce the taxes of the "secondary earner" int the family. This neu-
trality between men and women may not be constitutionally required. Gruenwald v.
Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968). Contra, Moritz v. Commissioner, CCH 1972
STAND. FED. TAx REP., U.S. TAx CAS. (72-2, at 85,908) 1 9751 (10th Cir). But it is
becoming a statutory practice. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a) (1) (Supp. III, 1973) equalizes the
retirement age for men and women for computing the social security benefit base, and
42 U.S.C. § 402(f) (Supp. III, 1973) gives widows and widowers equal rights to take
actuarially reduced benefits.
,8BULREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATisTiCAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrr=n STATES: 1971, at 331. The data were reported only for working wives, not
"secondary workers" of both sexes.
401d. at 334.
sold. at 234.
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capacities of different families. There is no reason to accept a propor-
tionally higher tax on FW, therefore, as a technique for reaching the
amount by which FW's tax capacity exceeds FH's.
Since the tax on Ww's wages cannot be justified as a general revenue
measure, it must instead be justified as the purchase price of her social
security benefits analagous to an insurance premium. From this per-
spective, the benefit- structure is defective because it fails to provide Ww
with a return for her taxes.' Both FW and FL have a tax base of $130,
but FW receives lower benefits than FL; instead FW's benefits equal
FH's even though FH pays a tax on only $100.51
There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with treating FH
and FW the same, as a welfare measure, even though FH's taxes are
lower than FW's. Indeed, the basic benefit structure for single workers
uses the surplus produced by the social security tax to raise the benefits
of workers with low incomes52 and general revenues finance a Supple-
mentary Security Income program53 which often gives individuals who
paid no taxes a benefit equal to the social security benefit.' The point
is that the equality of FH and FW in the social security system does not
result from a decision that FW, with a $130 tax base, should receive a
certain benefit and FH, as a matter of welfare policy, should be pro-
vided benefits at the same level. If such a welfare policy existed, it
would be similarly reflected in the basic benefit structure for single in-
sured workers with tax bases of $130 and $100. However, the benefit
levels of single workers earning these amounts are different, a difference
which mysteriously disappears in the case of FW and FH. Apparently,
FW's benefits have simply been allowed to remain at FH's benefit level
without regard to the fact that Ww's tax payments raised FW's tax
burden to the level borne by a family with a single worker earning $130.
The argument for giving Ww a fair r\eurn for her tax premiums
does not depend on a belief that the insurance premium analogy for social
security taxes is an accurate description of the tax-benefit structure. 5
5142 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1970).
42 Id.
53 Id. §§ 1381-83c.
541d. § 1382(b) (2).
55 Critics of the analogy point to the fact that private insurance benefits are a legal
obligation backed up by reserves, whereas social security benefits are funded on a pay-
as-you-go basis out of the current taxes of workers and are, therefore, subject to po-
litical, economic, and demographic exigencies. W. COHEN & M. FRIEDMAN, SOCIAL SE-
CURITY: UNivRSAL OR SELEcrW? 23-26 (1972).
In response, it is pointed out that social and private insurance may not be significantly
different. The political process seems to have produced social insurance benefits which
are a reasonable return in relation to prior taxes, PERSPECTIVES at 167-71, and the legal
rights in private insurance are subject to economic risks and may even be illusory if an
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It is sufficient that, in the public's view, the taxes purchase benefits
similar to insurance. There is no justification for a tax-benefit struc-
ture which purports to provide insurance for all purchasers except Ww.
Even if the insurance analogy were a fraud on the public, Ww is en-
titled to the same value for her taxes as any other taxpayer.
The unfairness of taxing Ww without providing corresponding
benefits could be remedied by exempting Ww from taxation 6 rather
than by increasing her family's benefit base. An exemption from tax has
the unfortunate effect, however, of treating Ww very differently from
other wage-workers whose work entitles them to compulsory social in-
surance benefits. Different treatment of Ww and other wage-workers
does not promote the overriding objective of achieving fair treatment
for working women. As long as Ww works and workers generally are
forced to buy insurance, Ww's $30 tax payment should entitle FW to
the same benefits as any other family earning $130.
It is not clear, however, that Ww should be forced to buy insurance
by paying tax on all $30 of her wages. The discussion of Ww's
tax-benefit situation has so far focused on the inequity between FW and
FL. We must also compare Ww with WH in this context before we too
readily give FW a $130 tax and benefit base. As noted earlier, the
public views the social security tax-benefit structure as an insurance
program which benefits its participants. If the primary concern is
neutrality between Ww in FW and WH in FH, rather than equity be-
tween FW and FL, Ww's participation in the insurance program should
be limited to the amount by which her wages give her a higher standard
of living than WH. The result is exactly the same whether we con-
sider the benefit structure alone or consider the tax-benefit relationship.
In both situations, there is a benefit dispensed by the government and
in both situations wage-workers should receive no greater advantage
over houseworkers than is accounted for by the improved standard of
living which has resulted from working for wages. The price of such
employee's assumptions about vesting are too optimistic. The close relationship between
current taxes and future benefits, which justifies use of the insurance premium analogy,
is not undermined by the fact that current taxes are used to finance a benefit structure
which provides lower income earners who survive to enjoy thcir benefits with a much
better insurance benefit than their taxes might warrant. As long as reserves are not
maintained and the system is on a pay-as-you-go basis, the surplus produced by an ex-
panding economy and favorable young:elderly population ratio can be used either to
lower social security taxes, help the poor, or for any other purpose. If future benefits
for middle income wage earners will be adequate in relation to current taxes, a reduc-
tion of tax premiums would result in a windfall for these taxpzyers, and the use of the
surplus for workers with low incomes is not unreasonable.
51 The appropriate mechanism might be a credit against income taxes. Workers
presently get a credit if social security taxes are overwithheld. Sections 31(b), 6413(c). I
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
neutrality may be inequity between FW and FL, both of whom earn
$130, but that inequity also resulted when we allowed Ww to deduct
household and child care for income tax purposes.
As a consequence of this analysis, Ww's participation in the in-
surance program should be limited to the $10 in wages which represent
the actual amount by which FW's standard of living was improved over
FH's because of Ww's wage-work. Only one-third of Ww's wages
would therefore be subject to taxation and, as in the situation where the
benefits were considered apart from taxes, only one-third of her wages
should be added to FW's benefit base.
We have shown that the administrative problem of increasing FW's
benefit base by one-third of Ww's wages can be solved by adjusting the
benefit bases of married couples by the specified percentage of Ww's
wages. The adjustment of her tax payment is more difficult. In order toSr&ain the simplicity of employer withholding on gross wages, Ww's
employer should continue to treat her as owing taxes on $30. Ww
would, however, be entitled to a refund at the end of the year for two-
thirds of her taxes, just as a worker whose social security taxes exceed
the maximum because he has worked for two employers is now entitled
to a refund."
Separate Benefits for the Wife
The resolution of the comparative tax-benefit treatment of FH to
FW and FL according to the "neutrality" principle does not determine
whether the wife's contribution to the family ought to be recognized by
awarding her a benefit "separate" from her husband's benefit. What-
ever benefit structure is chosen to equalize treatment of the family with
a working wife, the question of her entitlement to a separate benefit
still arises.
-The broadest conception of a "separate" benefit for the wife is a
partnership approach to the family's earnings. This approach would
recognize the wife's productive work by allocating to her a percentage,
perhaps half, of the family's benefit base as it is earned during the
family's productive years. Splitting family income in order to compute
benefit bases would, however, create irrational disparities between bene-
fits for families and single individuals with similar income. At present,
a family consisting of a husband and wife receives 50 percent more than
a single individual with the same benefit base in recognition of the
family's greater need. The welfare pbjectives behind aiding a family
57 Id.
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would be poorly served, however, by splitting the family's benefit base
between husband and wife. The problem arises because benefits represent
a larger percentage of the benefit base as income declines.5 If the total
earnings of a family were split between husband and wife during their
working lives, a family would receive an advantage over a single in-
dividual beyond that currently provided under the 50 percent supple-
ment. Furthermore, the added advantage over the single individual
derived by the family from splitting its income would not be a uniform
additional percentage of the benefits provided to single individuals with
the same earnings, as it now is; instead it would vary depending upon
how the benefit structure for individuals helps those with declining
incomes. A change in the relative benefits provided to families and those
provided to single individuals may, of course, be desirable. 9 Income
splitting, however, is a poor way to accomplish these welfare objectives.
Even if the partnership approach for computing the wife's benefit
base is rejected, the wife's contribution to the household might still be
recognized by assigning her a separate benefit. Thus, even if her benefit
base is not computed by allocating to her a share cf the family's earn-
ings during their productive years, a share of the family's benefits could
be hers, free from dependence upon whether or not the husband works.60
At present, the wife's benefits depend on her husband's work status
unless her benefits are based on her own remunerative work in the labor
force. Her 50 percent derivative benefit is not only mathematically
derived from her husband's benefit but is reduced if her husband has
earnings.6  Her separate contribution to the household might be better
r8 See note 51 supra.
11 Paspwclns at 84-86.60 A recent proposal would have allowed the wife a separate benefit if both husband
and wife had worked 20 years. H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 110 (1971). It permitted
the husband and wife to (1) add their earnings together to determine the benefit base,
(2) add 50 percent to the benefit derived from that base, and (3) split those benefits
between them. The main point of the proposal, however, was to treat families equally
regardless of which members of the family earned the income, it,., equalize FW and FL.
A separate benefit for each spouse was an incidental feature of the proposal.
15142 U.S.C. § 403(b) (1970).. When the husband's earnings reduce but do not
eliminate the family's benefits payable in a particular month, the amount payable to each
beneficiary is apportioned in accordance with each beneficiary's original entitlement with-
out adjustment for the family maximum and then reduced, if necessary, to reflect the
family maximum provisions. For example, assume that the benefits payable to a family
in which no one works are $100 for the husband, $50 for the wife and $50 for the child.
If the family maximum is $150, the benefits are reduced so that the husband (assuming
he is the insured worker) receives $100 and each dependent receives $25. Id. § 403(a).
If the husband works and his earnings reduce the $150 benefits ,y $70 (leaving $80 for
distribution among the family members), the $80 is allocated in a 2:1:1 ratio among the
family; i.e., $40 for the husband and $20 for each dependent. Since that is less than the
ceiling resulting from the family maximum, no further reduction is necessary. See So-
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reflected by allocating to her a portion of the family's total benefits and
making her share independent of her husband's work, just as it would
be if she had her own benefits based on her own wages.
If the wife is entitled to a separate benefit, what percentage is ap-
propriate? A useful analogy for determining the wife's share of family
earnings, which would support her claim to an equal share, is the ap-
proach taken by those states which recognize "community property. ' 2
Wages earned by remunerative work in the market place are not used
as the measure of each individual's contribution to the family's welfare.
The wife's separate benefit has so far been discussed on the as-
sumption that an undivided family unit was receiving benefits. The
partnership approach, allocating benefit bases to husband and wife, was
found deficient because it produced unjustified inequities between bene-
fits for a single individual and those for a family unit. The partnership
approach may be justified, however, when deciding how to recognize the
wife's individual productive contributions to a family which has been
separated because of divorce or death. Once the family unit separates,
it is inappropriate to compare the benefits to be received by its former
members with the benefits to be received by a single individual having
the same income as the family. For example, if WH in FH is divorced
from her husband at age 50, she might be allowed to carry with her
one-half of the family's benefit base ($50) rather than, as under the
present system, no benefit base resulting from her prior contribution
to the household.6" It is true that WH and her husband, if they each
continue to earn one-half of the family's benefit base ($50 each, for
example), will together receive more benefits than a single person earn-
ing FH's benefit base ($100). However, there is no reason to deny
WH and her husband these benefits, which are inherent in a benefit struc-
ture designed to aid poorer workers, if each member is entitled to be
viewed as a separate working unit once the family disintegrates. They
are no different from single individuals, each with a $50 benefit base,
whose total benefits exceed those of a single worker with a $100 benefit
base. If there is concern that a family unit might purposely split by
CIAL SECURITY AD., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY
HANDBOOK §§ 733, 734, 1809, 1810 (1974).024A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PRoPmTY 625, at 713-14 (1973). Community
property is any property acquired during the marriage other than by gift, descent, or de-
vise. It is divided equally between the spouses because they are presumed to have made
equal contributions to the family's wellbeing. Id.
6 8 Although she has no benefit base resulting from her role as housewife, she may be
entitled to derivative benefits based on her husband's earnings. See 42 U.S.C. §§
402(b) (1) ; (d) (1), (2) ; (e) (1) (1970).
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divorce just before benefits were to begin so that its members will receive
higher benefits, WH might be entitled to less than 50 percent of the
family's benefit base if they were divorced within some period before
benefits begin. 4
Ww's tax payment may appear to strengthen her claim for a benefit
separate from her husband's. However, reliance on Ww's tax payment
to establish the wife's rights would be unfortunate. Tax payments are
relevant in determining the family's benefit base but are not relevant
to the wife's share of that base. Her share depends upon her contribu-
tion to the household, not upon the market value attached to her -services
by the society at large. Emphasis on Ww's tax payment might imply
that WHa, who pays no tax, is less entitled to a separate benefit than Ww
and that the basis for allocating benefits to Ww is the market value of
her services on which taxes are paid. The wife's contribution to the
household should be a sufficient basis for providing her with separate
benefits on an equal basis with her husband whether or not she has paid
a tax and regardless of the price which the market place puts on her
services.
CONCLUSION
Congressional acceptance of the arguments in this article would
lead to the following changes in the income tax: 1) increase of the pre-
sent $18,000 income ceiling for deducting the full amount of household
and child care expenses; 2) allowance of the deduction for household
expenses, subject to a dollar ceiling, whether or not a child is being
cared for; 3) repeal of the requirement that the spouse work full time
in order to be eligible for the deduction; and 4) allowance of the de-
duction for household and child care expenses whether or not the tax-
payer elects the standard deduction.
The following changes would be made in the social security tax
and benefit systems: 1) reduction of the secondary worker's social
security tax base by two-thirds of that worker's wages; 2) increase of
the family's social security benefit base by one-third of the secondary
worker's wages; 3) creation of the spouse's right to a "derivative
benefit" that is independent of the primary worker's continued partici-
pation in the labor force; and 4) creation of a provision enabling a
divorced spouse to carry with her one-half of the family's benefit base.
64 Allocation of 50 percent of the family's benefit base to each family member when
the family splits may not be fair to the husband. As a single wcrker with $100 of wages,
he would have a $100 benefit base. Upon his divorce, should his benefit base for the
years of his marriage be only $50? A workable compromise might give the husband 75
percent of the family's benefit base while,'H carries $50 with her.
